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Some Notes on the Malayan Law
of Negligence
A. E. S. Tay* and J. H. M. Heah**
T HE TERM "MALAYA" COVERS what are now two distinct political
units: the fully independent Federation of Malaya and the
semi-independent State of Singapore, which have emerged from
a tangle of British settlements and colonies and British-protected
Malay states. The State of Singapore has sprung from the
Crown Colony of Singapore, which between 1826 and 1946
formed part of the larger Crown Colony of the Straits Settle-
ments. The two remaining Straits settlements-Penang (includ-
ing Province Wellesley) and Malacca-together with nine Malay
states' have become the Federation of Malaya. Although Penang
and Malacca, as British territories, have a very different legal
history from that of the Malay states, their welding together
into a political unit has been followed by legislation giving statu-
tory foundation for the application of the English common law
throughout the Federation; the historical differences, then, have
lost their practical point. The State of Singapore, on the other
hand, has had a continuous history as a British colony since its
modern foundation as a trading-post in 1819.
In the Federation of Malaya to-day, then, the application of
common law is provided by Section 3 (1) of the Civil Law Or-
dinance No. 5 of 1956, which states: "Save in so far as other pro-
vision has been made 2 or may hereafter be made by any written
* Miss Alice Tay Erh Soon, formerly assistant lecturer in the Faculty of
Law in the University of Malaya in Singapore, is now working on tort in
London before taking up a research scholarship in law in the Australian
National University.
** Mrs. Julia Heah Hock Meng was formerly a Research Assistant in the
Faculty of Law, University of Malaya in Singapore.
Abbreviations of Malayan law reports
F.M.S.L.R.: Federated Malay States Law Reports
Ky.: Kyshe's Reports
M.L.J.: Malayan Law Journal
S.S.L.R.: Straits Settlements Law Reports
1 Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang (all British Protectorates
since the 1870's and 1880's), Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu (all
transferred to Great Britain by Siam in 1909, when they became protected
states) and Johore, which asked for a British General Adviser in 1914.
2 State and Federal legislatures have a wide range of enactments, including
copies of modifications of certain Indian Acts like the Penal Code, Criminal
(Continued on next page)
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law in force in the Federation or any part thereof, the Court
shall apply the common law of England and the rules of equity
as administered in England at the date of the coming into force
of this Ordinance: 3 provided always that the said common law
and rules of equity shall be applied so far only as the circum-
stances of the States and Settlements comprised in the Federation
and their respective inhabitants permit and subject to such quali-
fications as local circumstances render necessary." 4 In the ab-
sence of such legislation, it is true to say that the general law of
England was never introduced or adopted in the Malay States
and that "the most that could be said was that portions of that
law were introduced by legislation which adopted, not English
law, but English principles and models for local laws"; 5 never-
theless for many years the influence of a British-trained Bench
and Bar has been such as to permeate the Malayan legal system
with English rules applied either directly or indirectly through
rules of statutory interpretation., This tendency to fall back on
English law has been especially evident when judges are forced
to fill in lacunae left by local law and legislation.7 In the par-
(Continued from preceding page)
Procedure Code, Evidence, Limitation and Land Acquisition Acts, and Civil
Procedure, Probate and Administration, Negotiable Instruments, Contract
and Specific Relief Acts.
3 7th April, 1956.
4 For earlier application of the same principle to cases in the Straits Settle-
ments, see: Choa Choon Neoh v. Spottiswoode (1869) 1 Ky. 216, at 221;
In the matter of Choo Eng Choon, decd. (1908), 12 S.S.L.R. 120 (The Six
Widows' Case); Khoo Hooi Leong v. Khoo Chong Yeok [1930] A. C. 346
P. C., where Lord Russell of Killowen said, at p. 355: "The modifications of
the law of England which obtain in the Colony in the application of that
law to the various alien races established there arise from the necessity of
preventing the injustice or oppression which would ensue if that law were
applied to alien races unmodified." See also the general account by Sir
Roland Braddell, 1 Law of the Straits Settlements (2d ed.) 62-88.
5 Re Yap Kwan Seng's Will (1924) 4 F.M.S.L.R. 313 at 316, per Sproule
Ag.C.J.C.
6 Adverse comment by the Bench on counsel's indiscriminate importation
of English rules may be found in: Leonard v. Nachiappa Chetty (1923) 4
F.M.S.L.R., 265, esp. 267-8 (Negri Sembilan case); Haji Abdul Rahman v.
Mohammed Hassan (1915) 1 F.M.S.L.R. 290 at 298 (Selangor case at Privy
Council); re Chong Fong Shen (1932) 1 M.L.J. 140 (Selangor; Goh Chong
Hin v. Consolidated Malay Rubber Estates Ltd. (1924) 5 F.M.S.L.R. 86 at
90 (Negri Sembilan case in Court of Appeal).
7 See, e.g., Kandasamy v. Suppiah (1919) 1 F.M.S.L.R. 381 at 381-2 and the
application of the rule against perpetuities in Re Yap Kwan Seng's Will,
supra.
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ticular field of tort, "the Court has always turned for guidance,
as to fundamental principles, to English decisions." s
Singapore, we have noted, had a continuous history as a
Crown Colony. There is some question whether Singapore (or
for that matter, Penang) was a settled territory or a ceded acqui-
sition for the purposes of the introduction of English law to the
colony. The question is academic since the whole body of ju-
dicial authorities on the matter accepted as fact that Singapore
was virtually uninhabited and certainly without law at the time
of "settlement," and that the Charter of Justice granted by George
IV on November 26, 1826, either introduced English law into
the Straits Settlements or confirmed its existence there.9 The
law applicable to Singapore as a result is as follows: 10
1) The common law, equity, civil and statute law prevailing
in England on November 26, 1826, so far as they are
applicable to the circumstances of Singapore and modi-
fied in their application to these circumstances,1 and so
far as they have not been altered by: -
a) Statutes passed before April 1, 1867,12 extending to
India; or passed after that date extending to the
Colony;
b) Indian Acts passed before April 1, 1867, and applying
to the Straits Settlements;
8 Government of Perak v. Adams (1914) 2 F.M.S.L.R. 144, per Woodward
J. C. Cf. Panicker v. Public Prosecutor (1915) 1 F.M.S.L.R. 169 (C. A.) at
183, where Sir Thomas Braddell C.J.C. referred to the common law of
England as "the acknowledged guide [in questions of tort] to which we must
turn in arriving at just decisions upon questions arising under that branch
of the law." See also Mohammed Gunny v. Vadwang Kuti and support
given there by Burton J. (1930) 7 F.M.S.L.R. 170.
9 The opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Yeap
Cheah Neo v. Ong Cheng Neo (1875) L. R. 6 P. C. 381, sets out the history
of the Straits Settlements at 392-4. See also Braddell, 1 Law of the Straits
Settlements (2d ed.) 1-33; Kyshe's "Judicial-Historical Preface" in 1
Kyshe's Reports i-cxxi (1885); Napier's Introduction to the Study of the
Law Administered in the Colony of the Straits Settlements (1898). The fol-
lowing cases also contain much interesting historical material: Kamoo v.
Bassett (1808) 1 Ky. 1 (Penang); In the Goods of Abdullah (1835) 2 Ky.
c.8 (Penang); R. v. Willans (1858) 3 Ky. 16; Fatimah v. Logan (1871) 1 Ky.
255; Scully v. Scully (1890) 4 Ky. 602 (Singapore); R. v. Yeoh Boon Leng
(1890) 4 Ky. 630 (Penang); Re Khoo Cheng Teow's Estate (1932) 2 M.L.J.
119 (Singapore).
10 Cf. Braddell, op. cit. supra note 4, at 60-61.
11 "Statutes relating to matters and exigencies peculiar to the local condition
of England and which are not adapted to the circumstances of the particular
colony, do not become a part of its law, although the general law of Eng-
land may be introduced."-from the opinion in Yeap Cheah Neo v. Ong
Cheng Neo, supra note 9, at 394. See also the cases cited in note 4.
12 The date on which the Straits Settlements passed from the control of the
India Office to that of the Colonial Office.
Sept., 1960
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c) Orders of the Crown in Council made under the Gov-
ernment of the Straits Settlements Act, 1866, 29 & 30
Vic. c. 115; or
d) Ordinances of the Colonial Legislature of Singapore
and its successors.
2) U. K. statute law extending to India which was passed
before April 1, 1867, and statutes extending to the colony
passed after that date.
3) Orders of the Crown in Council under the Government of
the Straits Settlements Act, 1866 (supra) and subsequent
Orders referring to Singapore.
4) Ordinances of the Colonial Legislature and of its suc-
cessors in Singapore.
5) Such mercantile law as is introduced by section 5 of
(Singapore) Ordinance No. 111 (Civil Law).13
The Federation of Malaya and Singapore, then, are as much
within the common law tradition as Australia, Canada or the
United States. While we have noted differences in the introduc-
tion and application of the common law in the two territories,
these do not affect the use of English principles in tort or the
manner of their application. Both territories, especially, are ap-
plying recent English developments in the law of tort.14 The
standard of the judiciary in Malaya has not been sufficiently high
or consistent 15 to make Malayan tort decisions of great intrinsic
interest, but they do indicate the way in which English decisions
have been exported and common problems of tort faced. For
all these purposes there is no significant distinction between
cases from the territories that are now the Federation of Malaya
and the territory that is now the State of Singapore. We have
simply treated the relevant cases as "Malayan" cases, arranging
them according to topics.
Nervous Shock
The practical difficulties besetting a claim for damages for
negligence resulting in nervous shock or mental disturbance-
proof of causal connexion, lack of confidence in medical knowl-
13 Now the Civil Law Ordinance (Cap. 24) of the Laws of the Colony of
Singapore, revised ed. 1955.
14 While past colonial judges have generally treated English sources as suf-
ficient, there is a growing tendency now to turn to helpful sources in the
Dominions and the U. S. A. Indian decisions, of course, have a special place
as historically, socially and legally relevant.
15 There has been a marked and socially interesting decline in the calibre
of judges in Malaya since the end of the 19th century.
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edge, suspicion of the all-too-easily simulated symptoms, and the
difficulty in exposing a fake claim due to such factors as lapse of
time between the event and the hearing-long stood in the way
of Courts granting protection against nervous disturbance. Fav-
ourable judicial policy backed by greater reliance on medical
knowledge, however, has gradually opened the way to serious
consideration of the legal principles involved. In 1901, damages
were awarded to a plaintiff who, though not hit by a vehicle
which crashed into her house when carelessly driven by the de-
fendant, was within the foreseeable area of impact and suffered
nervous shock and a miscarriage through fear for her safety.16
The basis of this type of claims has now clearly devolved on to
the defendant's duty of care to a plaintiff who comes within the
reasonable foresight of the defendant. "The duty to take care,"
said Lord Macmillan in Bourhill v. Young,17 "is the duty to avoid
doing anything or omitting to do anything the doing or omitting
to do which may have as its reasonable and probable conse-
quence injury to others, and the duty is owed to those to whom
injury may reasonably and probably be anticipated if the duty
is not observed." In this case, the plaintiff, a pregnant fishwife,
was alighting from a tram when a motor cyclist sped past on
the other side of the tram and collided with a car 40-50 yards
away. The plaintiff did not see the accident and was out of the
range of impact, but claimed that as a result of hearing the im-
pact and later seeing some blood on the scene, she suffered a mis-
carriage. She failed in her action, the Court holding that there
was no breach of duty to her. She could not "build on the wrong
to someone else." is
16 Dulieu v. White [1901] 2 K. B. 669, where Kennedy J. stressed, however
(at 675), that "the shock, where it operates through the mind, must be a
shock which arises from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to
oneself." Kennedy J., bound by the House of Lords and not by the Privy
Council, was able to ignore the latter's decision in Victoria Ry. Comrs. v.
Coultas (1888) 13 App. Cas. 222, which rejected a claim arising from nerv-
ous shock suffered as a result of fear of physical injury in the absence of
actual impact on the ground of remoteness. Australian courts, being bound
by the Privy Council decision, have restricted this decision to the finding
that the nervous shock involved in the facts did not cause physical injury.
17 [1943] A. C. 92 at 104.
Is Ibid., at p. 108, per Lord Wright. In the earlier case of Hambrook v.
Stokes [1925] 1 K. B. 141 the plaintiff was allowed to succeed even though
it had not been shown that the defendant owed any duty of care against
physical or emotional impact on the mother who feared for the safety of
her children. The Court, in fact, failed to deal with the problem, and estab-
lished instead a semblance of duty by treating the negligent defendant as
having a duty to all road-users.
Sept., 1960
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An interesting Malayan case, while applying the same
principle of duty of care, takes into account local social habits
which would be unusual in many other countries in defining the
area of foreseeability. The case is Zainab binte Ismail v. Mari-
muthu,19 where the defendant had negligently driven a lorry
down a quiet lane normally devoid of traffic and killed the plain-
tiff's daughter in front of a village stand-pipe (public water-tap).
The plaintiff saw the accident, suffered shock and was sick for
two years as a result. Mr. Justice Hill, specifically claiming to
follow Bourhill v. Young (supra) and distinguishing Hambrook
v. Stokes (supra), and Owens v. Liverpool Corporation,20 al-
lowed the plaintiff to succeed and held that a person who reck-
lessly drives a vehicle along a quiet and unfrequented lane
could reasonably foresee that it was likely to cause villagers to
look out and in doing so to see any accident. The defendant's
shock and resultant illness, in these circumstances, were not too
remote in law.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Where the bald facts of an injurious event lead to a reason-
able inference of other facts pointing to negligence on the part of
the defendant, a prima facie case is established, and the plaintiff
is not required to adduce direct evidence of the precise cause of
the event. Thus, when res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff is not re-
quired to prove duty, breach and causal connexion, but will be
entitled to succeed unless adequate explanation is given by the
defendant.2 1 In the Malayan case Che Jah binte Mohammed Arifi
v. C. C. Scott,22 the Court allowed the plaintiff to rest her case
on the principle of res ipsa loquitur on her evidence that she had
been injured, as a passenger in the defendant's car, when it
crashed into a stationary vehicle after the brakes had failed when
it was going downhill. The defendant, however, set out the plea
of inevitable accident, and gave evidence that 10 days earlier,
19 (1955) M. L. J. 22.
20 [1939] 1 K. B. 394.
21 The conditions for the application of res ipsa loquitur have been stated
as where "the thing is shown to be under the management of the defend-
ant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care,
it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of explanation by the defendant
that the accident arose from want of care."-Scott v. The London & St.
Katherine's Docks Co. (1865) 3 H. & C. 596, Ex. Ch.
22 (1952) M. L. J. 69.
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after discovering that the brakes were bad, he had sent the car
to a competent repair firm for general overhaul with specific in-
structions to attend to the brakes, that the day before the acci-
dent the plaintiff and defendant together had called at the repair
firm to collect the car to be told that the foreman was then en-
gaged in testing the brakes, and that when taking delivery the
defendant had himself tested the brakes and found them in order.
The Court held that the defendant had successfully shown that
the accident was inevitable, due to a latent defect which could
not be discovered by the exercise of reasonable care, and dis-
missed the plaintiff's suit. The learned judge, Jobling J., relied
heavily on Stennett v. Hancock,23 where Branson J. had said: 24
"I cannot think, however, that it would be right to say that a
person who employs a skilled and competent repairer to repair
his vehicle is omitting any duty which he owes to himself or to
anybody else if he trusts to that man having done his work
properly, and, in reliance upon that fact, takes the vehicle upon
the road."
In Malaya, the maxim res ipsa loquitur has also been applied
where a lorry ran into the back of a stationary trishaw 25 and
where a load of angle-irons fell from a loading sling on to a
tonkang (river junk), causing it to sink.2 6
Contributory Negligence
To amount to contributory negligence, the plaintiff's lack of
care must be a cause of the damage. The history of contributory
negligence at common law has been bedevilled by the problems
that arise when the conduct of each party amounted to a cause;
in order to avoid this outcome Courts were constantly tempted
to introduce further and otherwise unnecessary refinements to
the notion of a cause. In England, the matter was resolved by
legislation enabling the Court to estimate the relative importance
of the fault of each party, and to apportion the damages ac-
cordingly.27 Identical legislation has been adopted in the Federa-
23 [1939] 2 A. E. R. 578.
24 Ibid., at p. 579.
25 Yap Kim Chye v. Seow Seng Choon, (1952) M. L. J. 168.
26 S. S. Mydin Meerasahib v. K. M. S. Sultan Allaudin & Sons, (1949)
M. L. J. 72.
27 The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945. Section 1(1)
provides: "Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his
(Continued on next page)
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tion of Malaya and in Singapore.28 This legislation has resolved
the difficulties when the conduct of each party amounts to a
cause; it has not affected the fundamental common law principles
for determining what amounts to lack of reasonable care and
when it is a cause of the injury.29 These principles have also
been followed, and are being followed, in Malaya. In 1949,
Gordon Smith J. summarised the proper direction to a jury
when the defence pleads contributory negligence in Chaim
Flanchaura v. Koh Peng Koon: 30 (1) If it is established from
his own evidence or by evidence produced on behalf of the de-
fendant that the plaintiff could have avoided the collision by
the exercise of reasonable care, then the plaintiff fails because
his injury is due to his own negligence in failing to take care;
(2) If it is established that although the plaintiff was negligent
the defendant could have avoided the collision by the exercise of
reasonable care, then it is the defendant's failure to take that
reasonable care to which the resulting damage is due and the
plaintiff is entitled to recover; (3) mere failure to avoid the
collision by taking some extraordinary precaution does not in
itself constitute negligence: the plaintiff has no right to com-
plain if in the agony of the collision the defendant fails to take
care which might have prevented the collision, unless that step
is one which a reasonably careful man would fairly be expected
to take in the circumstances.
In the earlier case of Katijah binte Abdullah v. Lee Leong
Toh,3 1 the Court had before it the familiar elbow protruding
from a bus. The plaintiff was sitting in a bus with her arm
resting on the window-ledge and her elbow protruding when the
bus collided with an oncoming vehicle, causing her injury in the
(Continued from preceding page)
own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim
in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of
the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect
thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the Court thinks just and equita-
ble, having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the dam-
age: ...."
28 S. 12(1), Civil Law Ordinance No. 5 of 1956 (Federation of Malaya) and
S. 3(1), Contributory Negligence and Personal Injuries Ordinance, No. 37
of 1953 (Chapter 25, Laws of the Colony of Singapore, 1955).
29 Naturally, judicial policy on these matters has been affected by the dif-
ference that the legislation has made to the practical outcome of deciding
one way or the other on these questions.
30 (1949) M. L. J. 149. The learned judge refers to Swadling v. Cooper
[1931] A. C. 1.
31 (1940) M. L. J. 87.
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arm. Passengers were not warned against allowing their arms to
protrude. The learned judge held that a passenger, who owes no
duty to the driver of an oncoming vehicle, and seated in a normal
manner, not infringing any prohibition or disregarding any warn-
ing, cannot be guilty of contributory negligence. Whether the
same judge would have held this manner of sitting normal or
reasonable in New York or London traffic conditions is another
matter. In Vellamee v. Eng. & Co.,32 on similar facts but where
the vehicles had not collided, the Court held that the substantial
cause of the accident was the driving of the two vehicles too
close together.
Contributory Negligence in Actions on Statutory Duties
Statutory duties imposed upon employers by such legislation
as Mining and Factory Acts etc. for the protection of workmen
and others, whether these are careless or not, do not create a
statutory cause of action.3  Where a plaintiff is suing for damages
arising from a breach of a statutory duty, he must, as in all cases
where damage is the gist of the action, prove not only a breach
of duty to him but that his injury was due to the breach. It is
thus that the defence of contributory negligence may also avail
in this type of case,3 4 to which, indeed, the legislation allowing
apportionment of damages also applies. In Ng Siew Eng and
Another v. Loh Tuan Woon35 the deceased, riding a motorcycle
along a side road shortly after dark, collided with an iron bar
placed across the road by the defendant for the purpose of col-
lecting tolls and suffered injuries from which he died. The estate
of the deceased claimed that in placing the bar across the road
the defendant was both negligent and in breach of a statutory
provision.3" The Court held that in respect to the non-statutory
32 (1940) M. L. J. 246.
33 For the nature of such an action see Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Associated
Collieries Ltd. [1940] A. C. 152, per Lord Wright at 177-8.
34 See Lord Atkin, ibid. at 166.
35 (1955) M. L. J. 89.
36 S. 75 Road Traffic Ordinance, 1941 (Singapore) provides: "Any person
who for any purpose places or causes to be placed any rope, wire, chain,
tackle or similar apparatus across a road or any part thereof in such a
manner as to be likely to cause danger to persons using the road shall,
unless he proves that he had a lawful right or excuse so to do and that he
had taken all necessary means to give adequate warning of the danger, be
guilty of an offence against this Ordinance." This section, except for the
requirement to prove lawful right, is similar to S. 55 of the (English) Road
Traffic Act 1930, and thus enabled the Court to follow London Passenger
Transport Board v. Upson [1949] A. C. 155.
Sept., 1960
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issue of negligence, the defendant was not negligent to road-users
since he had placed a red reflector light at the end of the bar, and
that even if the bar could be said to constitute an unusual danger
vis-a-vis the deceased qua licensee, it was one known to him.
The defendant was in breach of a statutory duty in failing to
provide more effective lighting, but the negligence of the de-
ceased being the decisive cause of the accident, the claim must
fail.
Acts Done in the Execution of Public Authority
In Singapore, an action against a person for an act done in
pursuance of a public duty or authority, or for negligence in the
performance of such duty, must be commenced within six months
from the date of the cause of action.37 The Singapore Ordinance
is substantially the same as an English Act now repealed, 38 and
Singapore Courts have relied on English authorities for the dif-
ficulties raised by the English finding39 that not all intra vires
acts are protected, viz. that "it is not because the act out of which
an action arises is within their power that a public authority
enjoys the benefit of the statute. It is because the act is one
which is either an act in the direct execution of a statute, or in
the discharge of a public duty, or the exercise of a public au-
thority." 40 In Firestone Tire Rubber Co. (S. S.) Ltd. v. Singa-
pore Harbour Board,4 1 a cargo of rubber tyres consigned to the
appellants-plaintiffs was discharged from a ship by the Singapore
Harbour Board, the respondents-defendants, and received by the
Board on various dates in July, 1946, in their godowns. There was
short delivery to the extent of 17 tyres, and the appellants began
action in June, 1948, claiming damages for the loss of these
tyres. S. 73 of the Singapore Ports Ordinance 42 provided that
"the Board may. . . (c) carry on the business of. . . wharfingers
and warehousemen . . ." The Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council expressed its opinion that the Singapore Harbour Board,
a public authority, did not cease to function as such in operating
37 S. 2 (1) & (2), Public Authorities Protection Ordinance.
38 Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, now repealed by S. 1 of the Law
Reform (Limitations of Actions etc.) Act, 1954.
39 Bradford Corporation v. Myers, [1916] A. C. 242 and Griffiths v. Smith
[1941] A. C. 170.
40 Per Lord Buckmaster, in Bradford Corporation v. Myers, supra at 247.
41 [1952] A. C. 452 P. C.
42 Cap. 208 of the Laws of the Colony of Singapore, 1955.
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol9/iss3/10
9 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
the warehouses and engage upon some purely subsidiary activity
of a non-public nature. Supplying facilities essential to the ship-
ping and commercial community of Singapore in one of the ways
authorised by the Ports Ordinance was to fulfill one of the main
objects of the Ordinance. It was the opinion of the Judicial
Committee, therefore, that the Board, in taking the appellants
goods into their care and custody, were acting "in the course
of exercising for the benefit of the public an authority or power
conferred on them by the [Ordinance], 4a which was not merely
an incidental or subsidiary power. In Wee Hong Heng v. The
Municipal Commissioners of Singapore,44 the defendants were
under a statutory duty to construct, repair and maintain the
streets. They used a lorry of their own to transport the labour
force to and from work. On one such journey from the depot the
driver of their vehicle collided with the plaintiff's motorcycle,
injuring the plaintiff. The Court held that the defendants, in
transporting the labour force to and from their quarters, were
doing an act which they were not bound by an Ordinance to do,
and were therefore45 not protected by the Public Authorities
Protection Ordinance.
Damages for Personal Injury; and Loss of Expectation of Life
The focus of interest on these issues has long been on the
amount of damages awarded; the principles involved are wide
and general, and while they have failed to resolve the practical
problems of the judge or jury they have led to no subtle legal
difficulties. 46 In Malaya, the familiar principles have been ap-
plied in the familiar way; only, as one might expect in an
Asian country, life and comfort have been held cheap. In Kang
Bark Teng v. Lee Kwee Lim, 47 the expectation of life of a healthy
43 Cited by the Judicial Committee from Griffiths v. Smith, supra note 39, at
185, per Viscount Maugham.
44 (1937) M. L. J. 207.
45 If the report is sound, the law is defective in treating the absence of
statutory duty to perform the action as sufficient to indicate that it is not
protected; the real point is that the action was not one exercised for the
direct benefit of the public or exercisable toward the public impartially.
46 Some of the relevant English cases are: Ruskton v. National Coal Board
[1953] 1 Q. B. 495, establishing that amounts awarded in similar cases
should guide the Court; Flint v. Lovell [1935] 1 K. B. 354, establishing that
damages may be awarded for loss of expectation of life and the conditions
under which the Court of Appeal will vary the amount awarded by a judge
sitting without a jury; Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd.
(No. 2) [1942] 1 A. E. R. 664; Benham v. Gambling [1941] A. C. 157.
47 (1952) M. L. J. 27.
Sept., 1960
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29-year-old hawker, earning M$300 (U. S. $100 a month), was
valued at M$1,000 (U. S. $335). The same sum was awarded to
a Chinese woman miner whose expectation of life was estimated
at 20 years. 48 In Manasseh v. Attorney-General,9 a schoolboy
who suffered a fracture of the leg and wrist, which kept him from
school for five and a half months, had caused him great discomfort
up to the time of the hearing, and would leave a minor permanent
disability, was awarded M$1,250 (U. S. $413) in general damages.
Survival of Causes of Action
At English common law it was the general rule (bearing
some exceptions) that no executor or administrator could sue
or be sued for any tort committed against or by the deceased in
his lifetime: actio personalis moritur cum persona. The effect of
the maxim was abolished in England by the Law Reform (lis-
cellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934. The relevant provisions were
copied, in substantially similar words, by Singapore 50 and the
Federation of Malaya, 5 1 so that now, subject to certain provisions
in the Ordinances, as in the English Act, all causes of action
subsisting against or vested in a person at the time of his death
shall survive against, or for, the benefit of his estate. The new
rule does not apply to causes of action for defamation, seduc-
tion, inducing one spouse to leave or remain apart from the
other or claims for damages on the grounds of adultery. The
ordinances also provide that proceedings against the estate of a
deceased person are not maintainable unless they were either
(a) pending against him at the date of his death, or (b) taken
out not later than six months after his personal representatives
took out representation. Proceedings taken by the executor of
the deceased have been affected by not always consistent piece-
meal legislation; 52 in general it seems likely that in the absence
of clear statutory provision to the contrary, such proceedings are
48 Yee Kong v. Teh Seng, (1941) M. L. J. 58. Though this case was de-
cided before Benham v. Gambling, supra note 46, the principles upon which
the award was made accorded with the latter case.
49 (1949) M. L. J. 261.
50 S. 7(1), Civil Law Ordinance, Cap. 24 of the Laws of the Colony of
Singapore, 1955.
51 S. 8(1), Civil Law Ordinance, No. 5 of 1956, consolidating earlier legisla-
tion.
52 See, for example, Chan Chung Hoong v. Chew Vooi Peng (1955) M. L. J.
135, where the Court had to settle the conflict between S. 3 of the Executors
(Power) and Fatal Accidents Enactment and S. 4(i) of the Civil Law En-
actment, 1937.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol9/iss3/10
9 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
subject to a limitation of six years for most torts and three years
for personal injuries.
Death as a Cause of Action
At common law no action could be brought by any person
who suffered loss as the result of the death of another. 53 Malayan
law has followed the English Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 (S. 1), in
allowing an action to be brought (for the benefit of the wife,
husband, parent and child in the Federation legislation) 54 where
a person's death has been caused in such a way as would have
given him, if alive, a cause of action. 55 Neither English nor
Malayan legislation indicates the type of interests it is meant to
protect; English courts have held that the basis of the action
is pecuniary loss suffered by the dependents by virtue of the
death, which may include the loss of a "reasonable expectation
of pecuniary advantage" 56 but not a mere speculative possibility.
Applying these principles, the Court held in Yam binte Baba v.
Loy Chim57 that where the deceased, aged 12, and his brother
sold cakes in the morning and worked as golf caddies in the after-
noons and evenings, the damages were to be assessed according
to the length of time during which these earnings would be
coming into the household.
In the annals of the spread of the common law to other lands
and other ways, Malaya may deserve a modest place, but, as
the above selection no doubt shows, so far it has made no sig-
nificant contribution to the intellectual content of that law. It
has neither produced nor harboured a Cardozo or a Dixon. At
best, its judges have applied common law principles simply but
soundly; they have never, at least in tort, been subtle or illumi-
nating. Its legal history is of interest for its own sake; its legal
achievement awaits us in the future, not in the past.
53 Baker v. Bolton (1808) 1 Camp. 493.
54 The English Act also includes grandparents, grandchildren, step-parents
and step-children. There is a general tendency in Malayan legislation, in
view of the extended Asian family, the difficulty of checking family rela-
tionships, and the frequency of formal and informal adoption, to avoid
reference to "dependents" and to limit family relationships.
55 S. 12 of the Civil Law Ordinance, Cap. 24 of the Laws of the Colony of
Singapore, 1955, and S. 7 of the Civil Law Ordinance, 1956, of the Federa-
tion of Malaya.
56 Dalton v. S. E. Railway (1858) 4 C. B. (N. S.) 296.
57 (1939) M.L.J. 242.
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